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 In December 1948, the U.S. Marine Corps Gazette published an article by Lieuten-ant Colonel Rathvon M. Tompkins, who reported on British policy on and orga-
nization for combined operations, the term the British used at the time to describe 
amphibious operations.1 Tompkins was a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) veteran of 
landings at Tarawa and Saipan during the Second World War and had just com-
pleted a period working with the British at their School of Combined Operations 
in North Devon.2 He praised them for their development of amphibious tech-
niques during the war, but was less than complimentary about their postwar struc-
tures. In particular, he was critical of the “joint” (interservice) nature of the Com-
bined Operations Organization, stating that “[b]elonging to no one in particular 
and belonging to everyone in general, it is neither fish nor fowl nor yet good red 
herring.” Reflecting on the lack of priority given to amphibious operations, Tomp-
kins argued that, as it was not “squarely the responsibility of any one service,” the 
subject tended to “take on the aspects of an orphan 
child dependent on the indulgence and generosity 
of older members of the family.”3 When times were 
hard, as they were in Britain in the postwar years, 
the family was unlikely to be indulgent.
Tompkins clearly did not believe that the joint 
approach provided a model to be emulated. Per-
haps inevitably, given his own experience and 
institutional loyalties, he believed that a more 
logical solution would be to give the naval service, 
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specifically the Royal Marines, primary responsibility for amphibious warfare. In 
contrast, British policy consistently had emphasized the importance of joint ap-
proaches and joint structures or institutions in one form or another.
In the years immediately before the war, interservice activity in this field was 
enabled by work at the staff colleges, by joint committees, and at a small joint 
training and development center. Next, wartime requirements saw the estab-
lishment of an entirely independent joint organization, with responsibility for 
amphibious policy, training, and development and the conduct of minor raids. 
Major operations remained the responsibility of the established services, relying 
on nonspecialist forces. This system survived the end of the war and the inde-
pendent organization endured, in truncated form, until the early 1960s. At that 
point, the existing institutions were absorbed into a wider “joint warfare” struc-
ture, losing their independent status. In some respects, the result was a return to 
the prewar system, with interservice coordination achieved through joint com-
mittees and a small joint-training establishment. However, the Royal Marines 
now were identified as the “parent arm” for amphibious warfare, giving the naval 
service primacy in a role that previously had been considered entirely joint. This 
represented an important break from previous practice.4 
This article explores institutional responsibility for amphibious warfare from 
the late 1930s until the reforms of the 1960s. It will argue that a joint approach 
served British needs during the Second World War but contributed to poor 
results after 1945. British capabilities did not recover until amphibious warfare 
became the particular responsibility of the naval service, lending credence to the 
argument that Tompkins advanced. The key point is that joint imperatives tend to 
prosper when they have the support of a powerful patron or when key furnishers 
of support and material (usually the army, navy, or air force, or some combination 
thereof) recognize the value of the service or capability provided and are willing 
to make sacrifices to support it. This case study suggests that the most effective 
way to promote the development of joint capabilities is to link these explicitly to 
the self-interest of the key provider(s) and to build joint structures that encour-
age rather than inhibit this. These issues have wider relevance, and the article’s 
conclusion explores them with reference to contemporary joint initiatives in the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) and U.S. armed forces.
THE EMERGENCE OF JOINT INSTITUTIONS
It sometimes is argued that, discouraged by the failure at Gallipoli in 1915, the 
British ignored amphibious warfare during the interwar period. This was not the 
case. The army and navy both retained an interest in amphibious operations in 
the 1920s and 1930s and some useful training and experimental work was un-
dertaken, particularly at the staff colleges, which combined annually to conduct 
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a joint exercise. Lack of funds and lack of priority meant that the results were 
relatively modest, but practical exercises were conducted, doctrine was updated, 
and prototype landing craft were built. In accordance with long-standing prac-
tice, amphibious operations were understood to be a joint responsibility, and 
coordination among the services was achieved by employing joint committees 
and through cooperation at the staff colleges. The idea of employing the Royal 
Marines as a specialist amphibious force gained occasional backing within naval 
circles but had little support elsewhere.5 
In 1936, a subcommittee of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee was es-
tablished to support interservice training, and this group (DCOS[IT]) also was 
given responsibility for updating doctrine, in the form of the Manual of Com-
bined Operations. The new manual, completed in 1938, addressed all forms of 
“combined” (interservice) operations, although over half the text was devoted to 
topics relating to amphibious operations.6 DCOS(IT) also proposed the creation 
of what became the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC), 
established at Fort Cumberland (Portsmouth) in 1938.7 The ISTDC was tasked 
with training and development across the range of interservice operations, but 
amphibious considerations quickly came to dominate its work.
The ISTDC was an overtly joint organization. Prior to its establishment the na-
val staff college had proposed an entirely different approach, in which a training 
and development center would be built around a military force provided by the 
Royal Marines and supported by joint assets “as requisite.” The notion was that 
the navy and the marines would be given primary responsibility for amphibious 
warfare and that joint cooperation would be maintained on that basis.8 These 
ideas did not gain support from the other staff colleges or from DCOS(IT), de-
spite the support of the deputy chief of the naval staff. The joint vision prevailed.9 
The ISTDC had a small staff consisting of a naval commandant, one staff of-
ficer each from the army and air force, and a Royal Marines (RM) adjutant. It was 
instructed to study all joint operations and not to focus primarily on amphibious 
matters, in accordance with the prevailing view that combined operations encom-
passed any operation that the army, navy, or air force might have to conduct in 
cooperation with another service.10 In the event, the ISTDC ended up devoting 
much of its time to amphibious warfare. This reflected the sympathies of its first 
commandant, Captain Loben E. H. Maund, Royal Navy (RN), who was enthusi-
astic about amphibious operations and was able to push the center’s focus in that 
direction. However, his attempts to win for the ISTDC a role in planning such 
operations proved unsuccessful.11 
The ISTDC managed to do some good work before the war, particularly in 
supporting the design and construction of a small number of new, modern land-
ing craft. In this respect Britain was ahead of the United States.12 Unfortunately, 
3
Speller: “Neither Fish nor Fowl nor Yet Good Red Herring”—Joint Institutio
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 8 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
amphibious capabilities were not accorded a high priority in prewar British de-
fense planning. Lacking any obvious requirement for amphibious operations in 
the war they expected to fight, the British naturally prioritized other capabilities 
in an environment in which both time and money were desperately short. The 
approach was logical, but it left Britain ill prepared to deal with the unexpected 
realities of war. Lack of a dedicated amphibious force available at short notice 
undermined the British response to the German invasion of Norway in April 
1940. The absence of such a force made evacuation from Dunkirk more difficult 
in May–June 1940, and it forced the army to leave all its supplies and equipment 
on the beach. The fall of France brought a new requirement for raids to harass the 
enemy coast and a need to prepare for the kind of large operations that eventually 
might allow Allied armies to return to Europe, but Britain was not well placed to 
perform either role in the summer of 1940.
THE COMBINED OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION
The story of the wartime Combined Operations Organization has been told 
many times and will not be addressed in detail here.13 This new joint organization 
began as a tiny directorate set up within the Admiralty in June 1940, safely under 
the control of the navy. Within weeks, however, the prime minister intervened 
and appointed Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations. Keyes, an 
old acquaintance of Churchill and veteran of operations at Gallipoli (1915) and 
Zeebrugge (1918), was a retired admiral of the fleet and had been an outspoken 
critic of the Admiralty’s conduct of the war to date. His appointment was not 
popular with the Chiefs of Staff; the First Sea Lord was particularly aggrieved. 
One of Keyes’s first steps was to relocate his command out of the Admiralty and 
into a separate building in Whitehall, establishing Combined Operations Head-
quarters (COHQ) as an independent joint headquarters—a move that further 
alienated the navy, which viewed the new organization with suspicion.14 
Unfortunately, Keyes achieved rather little in his new role, lacking the tact, or-
ganizational skills, and intellect required for a position that naturally trespassed 
on ground that other, more-powerful groups considered to be their concern. 
He was replaced in October 1941 by the dynamic young naval officer Louis F. 
Mountbatten, who was promoted from captain to commodore and given the title 
of Adviser of Combined Operations.15 
Mountbatten, like Keyes, had been chosen by Churchill rather than the Chiefs 
of Staff. He rapidly expanded the staff of COHQ, from twenty-three individuals 
under Keyes to around four hundred, drawn from all three services. He was at 
pains to emphasize the interservice nature of the organization, particularly to 
those within COHQ.16 Reportedly, he succeeded to the point where his staff “al-
most forgot the colour of their uniform.”17 
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Like Keyes, Mountbatten sought to establish COHQ as an operational command 
independent of the services and, like Keyes, he failed. COHQ was responsible for 
planning minor raids employing special-service troops (i.e., commandos) but was 
not responsible for the conduct of major operations, responsibility for which re-
mained with the army, navy, and air force. COHQ’s key role remained the provision 
of technical advice on all aspects of opposed landings, coordination of training pol-
icy, command of training institutions, study of tactical and technical developments, 
and research and development (R&D) into new equipment and landing craft.18 
The importance of amphibious warfare within British policy was reflected in 
the March 1942 decision to promote Mountbatten to the acting rank of vice ad-
miral and the honorary ranks of air marshal and lieutenant general (to reflect the 
joint nature of his appointment). He was given the new title of Chief of Combined 
Operations (CCO), and as such sat as a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee when major issues were discussed or when amphibious matters were on 
the agenda—a major elevation in status. COHQ had a representative on the Joint 
Planning Staff and a representative on the British Joint Services Mission in Wash-
ington. Mountbatten remained in this position until August 1943, by which time 
COHQ had done much to develop British proficiency in amphibious operations. 
Departing to take up his new position as Supreme Allied Commander Southeast 
Asia, he was replaced as CCO by an army officer (and former commando leader), 
Major General Robert E. Laycock, who remained in the post until 1947.19 
From humble origins the Combined Operations Organization grew into 
something that began to resemble a fourth service. At the top of the organiza-
tion was CCO, who sat as a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee when 
relevant issues were discussed. He presided over an independent, interservice 
headquarters in London, and by 1942 was responsible for administering around 
a dozen training and experimental establishments in the United Kingdom and for 
providing advice to a similar number of training centers overseas.20 COHQ issued 
advice on a vast range of topics relating to amphibious warfare and maintained 
liaison with the United States to keep abreast of developments there. The arrival 
of nine American officers in summer 1942 made COHQ one of the first joint 
interallied headquarters in London. Combined Operations was also responsible 
for training landing craft officers and crewmembers and for administering the 
growing amphibious fleet. The Admiralty viewed this with concern, and in late 
1942 moved to regain control of something that was beginning to resemble a 
rival navy.21 
Starting from a low base, British amphibious capabilities expanded dramati-
cally, and amphibious operations evolved from a neglected art into a war-winning 
instrument. In 1939, the ISTDC had reported that a shortage of landing craft 
meant that Britain lacked the capacity to land even a brigade with less than six 
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months’ notice.22 By June 1944, the British were able to play the leading role in 
the largest and most complex amphibious operation of all time; 70 percent of the 
landing ships and craft employed during Operation NEPTUNE were RN vessels.23 
Small-scale raids became the business of amphibious specialists (commandos) 
but—as anticipated before the war—major operations were conducted largely 
by conventional military forces, assisted by a joint organization created for this 
purpose. Combined Operations played an important part in this, promoting 
training, development, and the identification of new techniques and new equip-
ment. It was aided, of course, by close collaboration with the United States.24 The 
independent organization grew out of an immediate need—in an environment 
in which amphibious forces were accorded a significant priority—and resources, 
while never sufficient, were plentiful in comparison with the 1930s. The organi-
zation enjoyed the support and sponsorship of the prime minister, as evidenced 
by his appointment of Keyes and promotion of Mountbatten—rather against the 
wishes of the Admiralty.
COMBINED OPERATIONS AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AFTER 1945
The British established the principles that would govern the postwar organiza-
tion for amphibious warfare in 1944, at around the same time as the Normandy 
landings were taking place. It is not surprising, therefore, that they remained 
wedded to established ideas about combined operations being a joint responsi-
bility. Despite this, the navy continued to advocate an approach that would put 
it in the driver’s seat. The Admiralty never had been reconciled entirely to the 
establishment of COHQ as an independent headquarters, nor did it maintain an 
easy relationship with either Keyes or Mountbatten, both of whom owed their 
position to Churchill, not the sponsorship of the First Sea Lord. Laycock was a 
less divisive character than either of his predecessors, but he often found himself 
facing the Admiralty as an adversary rather than an ally.25 
In May 1944, the First Sea Lord, Andrew B. Cunningham, advanced the no-
tion that in the future the Royal Marines should become the main source of 
amphibious advice and expertise and that they should be given responsibility 
for the provision, training, and development of all special-assault forces. He 
accepted the requirement to retain an interservice aspect to combined opera-
tions but believed that in the future CCO should be an RM officer acting with a 
“divided responsibility.”26 In many respects, this was a return to the general idea 
the navy had advanced before the war; joint liaison would be maintained, but 
the Royal Marines (and therefore the navy) would take primary responsibility 
for amphibious warfare. An interservice committee was set up to investigate the 
matter, with Air Marshal Sir Norman H. Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air 
Staff, as chairperson.27 
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The Bottomley Committee submitted its report to the Chiefs of Staff on 29 
June 1944. The report emphasized that amphibious warfare had to be accepted 
as a permanent commitment for the whole armed forces. This, the members ar-
gued, would require maintenance of the existing system, whereby CCO acted as 
the central advisory body, while the individual services remained responsible for 
the provision of equipment and personnel, and force commanders were respon-
sible for actual operations. They recommended the maintenance of a permanent, 
central, independent, interservice combined-operations organization, because 
amphibious warfare, “whilst involving all three services, is the exclusive province 
of no one of them.”28 
The possibility of creating a specialist amphibious corps along the lines of the 
USMC was investigated but was rejected as being uneconomical and ill suited to 
British requirements. The committee thought primarily in terms of major opera-
tions such as the one so recently undertaken at Normandy. Under this model, a 
specialist corps would not fit into the framework for postassault operations, which 
would call for conventional military forces. Nor would the British be able to afford 
to maintain a specialist force of the size required to conduct operations on the 
scale envisaged. The report concluded that “[t]here is no escaping the conclusion 
that the Army itself must be ready to find the assault force required in war.”29 
The committee did consider the possibility of maintaining in peacetime a per-
manent amphibious brigade of Royal Marines, available at short notice for emer-
gencies short of war, but, mirroring prewar assessments, it rejected the idea as 
being of doubtful utility. However, it was proposed that the Royal Marines should 
provide most of the personnel for a Special Service Group of 1,094 men, consist-
ing of a headquarters, two commando units, and a Small Operations Group. 
The main role of this group was to facilitate training and to act as a nucleus for 
expansion in war, but it was acknowledged that it also might provide a small and 
highly mobile unit for imperial defense, reflecting prewar ideas about the value 
of a Royal Marines Striking Force.30 
To maintain proficiency in amphibious warfare, the committee argued for 
the retention of the post of CCO and of COHQ as the central advisory body. It 
also called for the establishment of a permanent training organization designed 
to keep the armed forces as a whole competent in the practice of amphibious 
warfare, and for the maintenance of a Naval Assault Force. The latter (consisting 
of sixty-four ships, 135 major craft, and 256 minor craft) would support training 
and act as the nucleus about which to expand in any future war. A portion of the 
force would need to be kept available permanently, but the majority would be 
manned only during the annual training season.31 
Admiral Cunningham was not happy with these conclusions. He considered 
the Naval Assault Force to be too large, arguing that establishing a force of such 
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size would prejudice the maintenance of the postwar fleet. More fundamen-
tally, the committee had rejected his proposal to make amphibious warfare the 
particular responsibility of the Royal Marines, thereby leaving responsibility in 
the hands of an independent interservice organization not subject to Admiralty 
control. In response, he revived proposals made in 1943 to replace COHQ with 
an interservice committee along the lines of the Joint Planning Staff.32 
Cunningham was opposed on this point by the other chiefs and CCO. The 
“Report by Committee on Inter-service Responsibility for Amphibious Warfare” 
was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 29 July 1944.33 The armed 
forces thus agreed to maintain after the war an independent joint organization 
with responsibility for amphibious warfare; to set up institutions able to train 
joint forces and to promote R&D; and, in principle, on the need to establish a 
Naval Assault Force.
These plans did not long survive postwar austerity. The divisional-size lift en-
visaged for the Naval Assault Force soon was downgraded to brigade group–size 
lift, and even then the Admiralty complained that it could not resource this with-
out denuding the regular fleet of personnel. The Admiralty preferred something 
more modest: at most, sufficient lift for a commando brigade, smaller than its 
army equivalent and with fewer vehicles and supporting arms.34 It argued with 
CCO and the army over the requirement, but the debate was largely academic. 
Whatever the headline policy, only a handful of vessels was maintained in com-
mission after the war, making large-scale or widespread training impossible. The 
requirement eventually was reduced to the maintenance of sufficient lift for a 
battalion group, and this finally was achieved in 1951 with the establishment at 
Malta of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron (AWS).35 
The failure to maintain a large training fleet undermined the aspiration to keep 
the army as a whole conversant with amphibious operations. Similarly, ambitious 
plans to maintain a major training establishment also failed. The large wartime 
training centers were closed and were not replaced. In the event, only a small 
Combined Operations School and a Combined Operations Signals School were 
retained to develop and teach the techniques of amphibious warfare, supported 
by the Combined Operations Experimental Establishment, which undertook 
R&D work. For reasons of efficiency and cost, these were brought together—in 
1949, at Fremington in North Devon—to form the Combined Operations Centre 
(from 1951 known as the Amphibious Warfare Centre). The center did some 
useful work, despite Tompkins’s criticism that its approach confined amphibious 
warfare to an academic niche from which it was “removed annually, for a few 
days at a time, to satisfy a requirement in a staff college syllabus.”36 The center at 
least did maintain a fruitful relationship with the USMC, hence Tompkins’s spell 
in North Devon.
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Army interest in amphibious warfare was reflected in Exercise SPEARHEAD, 
a major joint exercise conducted at the Staff College at Camberley in May 1947. 
In addition, during the postwar years the army provided COHQ and CCO with 
much-needed support in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, frustrating numerous 
attempts by the Admiralty to downgrade or abolish the organization. In some re-
spects, it was easy for the army to support COHQ—it cost it little to do so. How-
ever, the army’s interest did not extend to maintaining the army commando units 
that were raised during the war, nor did it translate into regular or systematic 
training for army formations. Joint amphibious exercises did occur, but tended to 
be small-scale and rather ad hoc, much as they had been before the war.37 
The Royal Marines retained three battalion-size commandos, organized into 3 
Commando Brigade, and these undertook commando training at the Comman-
do School, Royal Marines (based first at Towyn, then Bickleigh, later Lympstone). 
In 1948, the Amphibious School, Royal Marines was set up to train landing-craft 
crewmembers, and the school also absorbed several joint combined-operations 
units that were too small to administer themselves.38 
Apart from a small number of combined-operations specialists, the Royal 
Marines were the only British troops to receive anything like regular amphibious 
training, although even they were unable to focus on this role as much as they 
might have wished. Commando units often were employed ashore in imperial 
policing or counterinsurgency duties, reducing their availability to perform their 
amphibious role. When the British agreed to send a commando unit to Korea to 
assist the United Nations in 1950, they had to raise a new unit, 41 (Independent) 
Commando, from volunteers and from a draft of reinforcements that had been 
due to be sent to Malaya, where 3 Commando Brigade was being employed 
ashore to chase Communist insurgents. The marines of 41 Commando under-
took a number of successful raids behind North Korean lines and participated in 
the epic action with U.S. Marines around the Chosin Reservoir and in the retreat 
to Hungnam, earning a Presidential Unit Citation in the process. That they did 
so with American equipment; carrying American weapons; and landed from 
American ships, craft, and submarines may say something about the state of Brit-
ish preparedness for amphibious operations in 1950.39 
Lack of priority was particularly apparent with reference to the amphibi-
ous fleet. Despite the return to the United States of Lend-Lease vessels and the 
scrapping of hundreds of worn-out craft, the British still had many amphibious 
ships and craft available at the end of the war. However, shortage of finance and 
manpower made the navy reluctant to keep many of these in commission, and 
most quietly rotted away in low-priority reserve. Vessels built to wartime stan-
dards and designed to meet wartime contingencies were beginning to show their 
design limitations by the 1950s, and many were becoming rather dilapidated. 
9
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COHQ pressed for new construction to replace these, and also for new ships to 
fill the gaps that existed within the fleet (particularly with respect to fire-support 
and infantry-assault vessels).40 The Admiralty successfully resisted such pressure 
and, with the exception of a handful of minor craft, no new amphibious ships or 
craft were built before the 1960s.41 
The key problem was that, while lip service was given to the notion that am-
phibious warfare was important, it was not as important as other, more-pressing 
concerns. The army was keen to retain expertise in amphibious operations, but 
the cost of doing this fell largely on the navy. The admirals had other things to 
worry about and preferred to prioritize more-traditional sea-control tasks. CCO 
could advance the cause of amphibious warfare in the Chiefs of Staff Commit-
tee, and did so, but he was not well placed to force any of the services to devote 
scarce resources to the matter. The prevailing concept remained for amphibious 
operations on a similar model to Normandy in 1944. It was clear that such op-
erations could not occur in the early stages of any war against the Soviet Union, 
when once again survival might be the major issue. If they were required only 
in the later stages, then the immediate need was for developmental work to keep 
techniques up to date and for a small cadre to provide a basis on which to expand 
after mobilization. Raiding might be needed in the early stages of war, although 
even here lack of priority meant that equipment, training, and personnel were 
recognized to be inadequate to meet planned requirements.42 
In some respects, the overall approach was logical enough, given the type of 
war that Britain expected to fight. Once again, however, the British armed forces 
neglected to recognize the potential for amphibious forces to provide the ability 
to deal with the unexpected. Failure to maintain in peacetime a credible am-
phibious force made it harder for Britain to respond effectively to several crises 
beyond Europe, as was evident in the case of Korea. A shortage of appropriate 
ships available at short notice undermined British planning during the Abadan 
crisis in 1951.43 It complicated planning for reinforcement of the Suez Canal zone 
in the event of major trouble in the early 1950s. And, most seriously, it badly un-
dermined the British response to Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 
July 1956.44 Humiliation at Suez helped to illustrate the shortcomings in Britain’s 
amphibious capability, notwithstanding the innovative use of helicopters to land 
marines on the beach at Port Said in November.
The navy’s attitude to the independent Combined Operations Organization 
always had been, at best, ambivalent. Its leaders did not appreciate being ha-
rassed and held to account by CCO on matters relating to amphibious warfare 
when they lacked sufficient resources to support roles to which they accorded a 
much higher priority. In the period between 1944 and 1954, the Admiralty made 
repeated attempts to undermine COHQ’s independence, reduce its staff, or have 
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it abolished entirely. The Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter numerous times. 
Army support for Combined Operations prevented the Admiralty from getting 
its way but could not stop a steady reduction in staff and resources; by 1949, there 
were just thirteen officers based at COHQ, and additional cuts followed.45 The 
navy’s preferred approach was to amalgamate the post of CCO with that of the 
Commandant General, Royal Marines (CGRM), but the prevailing concept of 
amphibious operations as a joint responsibility within the context of major war 
scenarios conspired to frustrate these plans.46 
This all began to change in the 1950s as British military planning began to 
reflect the implications of the emerging nuclear stalemate. There was growing 
appreciation that a major war in Europe was now unlikely and, if it did occur, 
probably would be characterized by an early and devastating nuclear exchange. 
In such circumstances, the need for sustained, large-scale, conventional military 
operations appeared doubtful. This posed challenges for all the services, but 
especially the Royal Navy, whose primary role—sea control in a major Euro-
pean war—began to lose credibility. The wider availability of nuclear weapons 
certainly posed problems for a concept of amphibious operations rooted in the 
Normandy model. On the other hand, there was a growing understanding that 
there was an increased likelihood of crises and conflicts beyond Europe, and the 
navy began to explore the potential to use flexible maritime forces as a means of 
responding to these.47 
In July 1954, the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the conclusions of a joint working 
party chaired by the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. The joint working party argued 
that the advent of the hydrogen bomb meant that the requirement for amphibious 
operations in a major conflict now was limited to small-scale raids; operations 
on a larger scale would have to be sponsored by the United States. Given this, 
the requirement for training in peacetime could be limited to staff-level studies, 
with exercises up to the strength of a reinforced battalion group. There was no 
longer a requirement to keep the armed forces as a whole conversant with the 
principles of amphibious operations. Now, for the first time, such operations 
could become the primary responsibility of one group. The working party argued 
that the interservice nature of the amphibious warfare organization should be 
retained, but it concluded that the time was right for the Royal Marines to play 
the “predominant part.” The members also recommended that the Amphibious 
Warfare Centre should move from Fremington to amalgamate with the Amphibi-
ous School, Royal Marines at Poole. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed this move and 
the conclusion that the Royal Marines should become the “parent body” for am-
phibious warfare. It was accepted that there was “no requirement for the Army 
as a whole to be trained in amphibious warfare.”48 As a result, Amphibious War-
fare Headquarters (AWHQ), as COHQ had been renamed in 1951, continued 
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to represent amphibious needs in Whitehall (with a reduced staff), and a Joint 
Services Amphibious Warfare Centre (JSAWC) was created at Poole with the 
amalgamation of the Amphibious Warfare Centre and the Amphibious School, 
Royal Marines.49 Amphibious warfare remained a joint responsibility, but for the 
first time the navy was in the driver’s seat.
Ten years earlier this might have caused a problem; the Admiralty had been 
less than enthusiastic about amphibious operations. But by the mid-1950s things 
were beginning to change. In a context in which major war in Europe appeared 
unlikely, and any such war was expected to “go nuclear” in its early stages, the 
navy’s focus on sea control in a third Battle of the Atlantic began to look less 
than credible; the service was preparing for the wrong war. As a result, the navy 
underwent a radical change in approach. Even before the 1956 Suez crisis, the 
Admiralty had begun to think about the provision of flexible options for lim-
ited war and crisis management beyond Europe, and the failure of Operation 
MUSKETEER reinforced the need for change. Within this context, amphibious 
forces gained a new relevance within a broader expeditionary approach.
A DIFFERENT TYPE OF JOINTERY
From the late 1950s, the Admiralty embraced amphibious forces as a key element 
within an expeditionary approach designed to provide Britain with flexible op-
tions for crisis management and limited-war contingencies beyond Europe. The 
inherent mobility of amphibious forces had the advantage of reducing reliance on 
a diminishing number of overseas bases and of providing access without the need 
to negotiate overflight or basing rights. The utility of this was demonstrated on 
numerous occasions, notably including the interventions in Kuwait (1961) and 
East Africa (1964). The role also gave the navy a means of justifying retention of a 
large, balanced fleet and could be mobilized to support the case for the next gen-
eration of large aircraft carriers. Thus—for the first time since the Second World 
War—amphibious warfare became a major priority for the navy, in support of an 
expeditionary strategy requiring balanced forces.50 
To support its new expeditionary approach, the navy replaced the aging AWS 
with two new assault ships (LPDs), commissioned in 1965 and 1967, and convert-
ed two light aircraft carriers into landing platform helicopter (LPH)–style “com-
mando carriers” in 1960 and 1962. Six new logistic landing ships (LSLs) were 
built to carry follow-on forces and provide logistic lift for the army in peacetime. 
Operated initially by the British India Steam Navigation Company on behalf of 
the Ministry of Transport, the LSLs transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in 
1970. This new capability was designed to carry, land, and sustain in combat a 
balanced army brigade group; it was not intended only for marines. The com-
mandos could provide a very useful light “fire brigade” designed to deal quickly 
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/7
 S P E L L E R  9 7
with minor conflagrations, but British policy was built on the idea that larger and 
more heavily equipped forces might be required in some circumstances. Thus, 
the LPDs and LSLs were designed specifically to carry and land the full range of 
army equipment, including tanks. They were to be part of a joint capability that 
the navy dubbed the Joint Services Seaborne Force.51 
Nonetheless, this was all good for the Royal Marines. The Commando Brigade 
expanded from three to five active battalion-size commandos. (Plans to raise a 
sixth were dropped quietly owing to fear of opposition from the army.)52 From 
1962 the commandos were reinforced with 105 mm pack howitzers, provided by 
the Royal Artillery, further enhancing the offensive potential of the commando / 
commando carrier combination and reflecting the evolution toward an expe-
ditionary role, as distinct from their previous rationale of wartime raiding.53 It 
should be stressed that, despite these additions, 3 Commando Brigade was an RM 
unit with joint elements attached—it remained firmly within the naval service. 
The Admiralty rejected suggestions that the army routinely should contribute 
infantry battalions to the Commando Brigade, and that command of the brigade 
should rotate between the army and the marines, accurately surmising that these 
reflected gambits designed to protect army regiments from cuts rather than any 
serious or sustained interest in amphibious operations. It was not difficult to 
show that rotating line battalions through the brigade was a poor substitute for 
the employment of well-trained amphibious specialists, although this did not 
stop army battalions from working with the brigade, as they did during the 1982 
Falklands War.54 
The 1958 edition of the Naval War Manual noted only two forms of amphibi-
ous operations, raids and invasions, and both within a major war context.55 But 
by the time the edition was published, it already was apparent that Britain re-
quired a new concept of operations, one that focused less on tip-and-run raids or 
ponderous, large-scale assaults against defended beaches, but instead promoted 
enhanced range and mobility and greater responsiveness within a limited war 
context. The matter was explored in detail by AWHQ and by the Land/Air War-
fare Committee, the two bodies responsible for amphibious and for airborne 
techniques. This led to the development of the “seaborne/airborne concept,” 
which was studied and refined in collaboration between these two organizations 
and the Staff Training Unit at the JSAWC and the School of Land/Air Warfare 
at Old Sarum (Wiltshire). The concept sought to exploit the complementary 
strengths of seaborne and airborne forces to enable a rapid and flexible approach 
to expeditionary operations overseas, with the idea that a light but adaptable 
force immediately available might be more effective than larger forces requiring 
a longer timescale. It represented a major departure from the traditional (1940s-
style) amphibious operations envisaged to that point. Amphibious forces now 
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were to be viewed as being part of a single team that also included airborne and 
air-transported elements.56 
Under this new concept, seaborne and airborne forces were to cooperate in 
a seamless manner. Given this, it made little sense to divide responsibility for 
developing the concept between separate amphibious and land/air organiza-
tions; a new institutional structure was needed. A new Joint Warfare Committee 
(JWC) was established in January 1962, replacing both AWHQ and the Land/Air 
Warfare Committee. It reflected the latter more than the former, as it was not an 
independent headquarters but rather an interservice committee responsible to 
the services via the chiefs. The JWC met ten times in its first year, chaired by the 
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, with individual representatives from each ser-
vice and the Director of the Joint Warfare Staff (see below).57 Additional members 
were co-opted as required.58 
The JWC had three subcommittees, dealing with offensive support, air- 
transport support, and amphibious warfare. The first two reflected the focus of 
the two main wings of the old School of Land/Air Warfare.59 The Amphibious 
Warfare Sub-Committee was responsible for providing advice and recommenda-
tions on policy, techniques, tactical developments, and training for amphibious 
operations. It also was to advise on the collection of intelligence required for 
amphibious operations and to ensure standardization and compatibility of equip-
ment. Its remit was narrower than that of AWHQ, and responsibility for matters 
such as amphibious equipment and logistics was given to the services; for practi-
cal reasons, this fell largely on the navy.60 
The JWC was supported by a small interservice secretariat, known as the Joint 
Warfare Staff (JWS). This consisted of a two-star director, a one-star deputy, and 
ten other officers drawn from the three services. The first director was Major 
General Robert D. “Titch” Houghton, RM, who had been the last Chief of Am-
phibious Warfare (the Chief of Combined Operations had adopted this new title 
in 1951). His new role lacked the direct access to the Chiefs of Staff that had been 
a feature of his previous post. Instead he was to submit an annual report to the 
JWC, which would forward it to the chiefs for consideration. The JWS inherited 
AWHQ’s location and its staff and adopted the old Combined Operations badge; 
it was, however, a very different type of organization. It had a much broader remit 
than had AWHQ, having also to address wider issues relating to joint warfare.61 
The inevitable result was that it could devote less time to consideration of am-
phibious warfare than had the previous organization.
An important role for the JWS and JWC was the production of doctrine, in 
the form of a Manual of Joint Warfare, building on the principles outlined in 
the seaborne/airborne concept. The first edition was issued in February 1964. 
It focused on all aspects of nonnuclear joint warfare beyond Europe. The topic 
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of amphibious operations was addressed in volume 4 of the manual, which em-
phasized that such operations were essentially joint in nature. The manual was 
revised three times in the 1960s, with updated versions released in 1965, 1967, 
and 1970. By the time the last version was issued it no longer focused on non-
nuclear options beyond Europe but instead covered all aspects of joint warfare. 
It reflected the growing reemphasis within British defense policy on war fighting 
within the NATO region.62 
In addition to the above, the Staff Training Unit of the JSAWC and the School 
of Land/Air Warfare were brought together to create a new Joint Warfare Estab-
lishment (JWE) at Old Sarum. This was responsible for formulating and teach-
ing the tactical doctrine, procedures, and techniques required for joint warfare. 
The Royal Marines retained an Amphibious Training Unit and a Trials Section 
at Poole, where they continued to undertake amphibious training—a task more 
readily conducted there than at the JWE, which was situated thirty miles inland. 
The Chief of the Air Staff wanted the JWE always to have a Royal Air Force (RAF) 
officer as director, clearly believing that airpower issues predominated. However, 
neither the army nor the navy supported him in this matter, and the directorship 
rotated among the services.63 
The JWE concentrated initially on training and the development of doctrine 
designed to support the type of expeditionary operations envisaged in the sea-
borne/airborne concept. However, it later expanded its scope to all forms of joint 
warfare, particularly as, by the early 1970s, British defense policy once again was 
focused heavily on the NATO region and the conduct of expeditionary opera-
tions began to be regarded as an unlikely requirement. The bread and butter of 
the JWE was a two-week Joint Warfare Course that focused on the conduct of 
conventional joint operations.64 The JWE ran a number of other courses, includ-
ing an Amphibious Warfare Planning Course, but amphibious operations were 
never its primary focus.
Christian Liles has emphasized that these new structures reflected the long-
established British preference for a joint approach to amphibious operations. He 
argues that attitudes toward amphibious warfare reflected those that had existed 
in the 1930s, when the approach had focused on combined operations more gen-
erally, not solely on amphibious warfare. Thus, he notes, the remit of the ISTDC 
was similar to that of the new JWE, with its focus on air, land, and maritime 
cooperation. The new Manual of Joint Warfare covered much more than just 
amphibious warfare, as had the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations.65 
It is true that the British continued to identify amphibious operations as being 
a joint responsibility. There was no suggestion that amphibious operations were 
the sole preserve of the navy and the marines. This was evident in the institutional 
structure described above and in the new Manual of Joint Warfare. It was reflected 
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in the design of the new amphibious ships constructed during the 1960s, which 
were built to accommodate a balanced military force, including the full range of 
army equipment. The Commando Brigade—the unit most likely to be at the fore-
front of any amphibious operation—had joint forces attached. The joint approach 
also was apparent in the Admiralty’s vision for expeditionary operations in the 
early 1960s, the aptly named Joint Services Seaborne Force. However, the decision 
to make the naval service the “parent arm” for amphibious warfare represented 
an important change in policy and practice, with broadly positive consequences.
It became apparent to the Admiralty that the new joint institutions were nei-
ther staffed nor organized to do the work that AWHQ had done formerly, and 
that therefore, “in the absence of a joint organisation,” additional responsibilities 
relating to policy and development now would fall on the Admiralty itself.66 The 
Director of Tactical and Weapons Policy, restyled the Director of Naval and Tacti-
cal Weapons Policy from 1965, became responsible for amphibious warfare and 
for the coordination of joint-warfare matters, and he sought additional staff to 
help carry the weight. He was advised by the CGRM on the military aspects of 
amphibious warfare and on all matters pertaining to the Royal Marines.67 
In a practical sense, amphibious training and development centered on the 
navy’s amphibious ships and the Royal Marine commandos. In 1965, the AWS 
changed its base from Bahrain to Singapore, prompting the Commander-in-
Chief, Far East Fleet to request that a commodore be appointed to command 
these ships, promote amphibious training and development, and work with 
the commander of 3 Commando Brigade. This resulted in the appointment of 
Hardress “Harpy” Lloyd as Commodore Amphibious Forces, Far East Fleet in 
May 1965.68 The post was relocated to the United Kingdom in 1971, with the 
Commodore Amphibious Warfare (COMAW) now responsible to the two-star 
Flag Officer, Carriers and Amphibious Ships.69 In the years ahead, COMAW 
and his staff would represent the main repository of expertise in amphibious 
operations within the Royal Navy. The only military force to undertake regular 
training and exercises in such operations, and to work closely with COMAW, was 
3 Commando Brigade. The institutional structure and latest doctrine may have 
stressed the joint nature of amphibious operations, but in most practical senses 
expertise in amphibious warfare was limited to those wearing dark blue uniforms 
and those in green berets.70 
The reorganization of the early 1960s was initiated at a time when expedition-
ary operations were emphasized within British defense policy and when there 
was interest in enhancing joint cooperation within the Ministry of Defence. This 
was evident in the reform of that ministry in 1964 and the adoption of unified 
(joint) commands in the Middle East (1959), Near East (1961), and Far East 
(1962).71 By the end of the decade, things had begun to change. The refocus on 
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Europe that accompanied the British withdrawal from “East of Suez” was char-
acterized by growing doubts about the need for expeditionary capabilities and by 
the services retreating toward what were seen as core roles. Those roles tended to 
revolve around single-service priorities. As Admiral Sir Jonathon Band recalled, 
“The 1970s heralded the start of a bleak period for jointery.”72 The unified com-
mands were abandoned and command and control was subsumed within NATO 
structures. The JWE was disbanded in 1979 and incorporated (with reduced 
staff) into the National Defence College at Latimer, as the new Joint Warfare 
Wing. Two years later it was decided to close this wing entirely—a decision re-
versed only after the Falklands War demonstrated the value of joint operations.73 
The change in policy meant that amphibious forces were confined, once again, 
to the periphery of British defense interest. In the 1970s, the Commando Brigade 
contracted back to three commando units, and the two commando carriers were 
decommissioned without replacement. In 1975, replacements for the LPDs were 
removed from the Ministry of Defence Long Term Costings, and by 1981 existing 
ships appeared under threat within the context of a defense review that sought to 
force the navy to focus ever more narrowly on sea control in the eastern Atlan-
tic.74 Perhaps typically, Major General Julian H. A. Thompson, RM, recalled that 
as a student at the joint Royal College of Defence Studies (1979–80) he submitted 
a paper on expeditionary warfare that was sent to the Ministry of Defence for 
comment. It was returned with the suggestion that he had wasted his time; such 
operations never would happen again.75 Two years later, Thompson commanded 
3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War, in a campaign that included a 
brigade-level amphibious landing at San Carlos. Success there rested on the ag-
ing remains of the 1960s amphibious force and on the expertise possessed by the 
Royal Marines and by COMAW (Commodore Michael C. “Mike” Clapp) and his 
staff. This expertise was not evident in other elements of the joint force.76 
The Falklands War did not lead to an immediate change in overall British 
defense policy. Joint warfare and expeditionary operations did not regain their 
prominence in British defense planning until the end of the Cold War brought yet 
another reversal of defense priorities. The ensuing decade brought the rejuvena-
tion of Britain’s aging amphibious fleet, and the navy once again emphasized the 
value of amphibious forces and aircraft carriers as a means of projecting power 
overseas. Joint warfare emerged from the shadows to become a key issue. The 
result was the formation of a joint operational command, joint logistics organi-
zation, joint doctrine and concepts center, and joint staff college to replace the 
single-service alternatives.77 Amphibious warfare remained a joint concern and 
involved joint forces, but the Royal Navy and Royal Marines were clearly the 
parent arms. This was reflected in the confidential 1997 publication The United 
Kingdom Approach to Amphibious Operations, produced in collaboration between 
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the Headquarters Royal Marines and the Royal Navy’s Maritime Warfare Centre.78 
The latter was responsible for delivering a short Amphibious Planning Course, 
once the responsibility of the JWE.79 The only course at the new joint staff col-
lege that focused explicitly on amphibious operations, the Advanced Amphibious 
Warfare Course, was provided for Royal Marines officers.80 Operational responsi-
bility for amphibious forces was vested in Commander, Amphibious Task Group 
(a naval officer) and Commander, U.K. Amphibious Forces (a Royal Marine).
SUMMARY TO THE 1960s
Throughout the period covered by this article, the British viewed amphibious 
operations as an activity involving joint forces. However, what this meant in 
practice changed over time.
Immediately before the war, amphibious operations were considered within 
a concept of combined operations that encompassed all forms of interservice 
activity. Naval attempts to gain prime responsibility for amphibious warfare were 
not successful.
The events of 1940 gave amphibious operations a new priority, as complex, 
large-scale operations became a necessary precursor to eventual victory. To equip 
themselves for this unexpected task, the British created a new, thoroughly joint 
organization that developed a thoroughly joint approach. Amphibious operations 
were the business of all three services, and major operations were conducted by 
conventional forces, not a dedicated amphibious corps. Training and the devel-
opment of equipment and doctrine were in the hands of an independent joint 
organization, which also administered a number of combined-operations units 
required for training, minor raids, or specialist tasks within major operations.
This model was retained at the end of the war, in the belief that the armed 
forces as a whole had to be able to undertake amphibious operations and that this 
was the best way to prepare to do so. Once again, attempts by the navy to take 
primary responsibility (via the Royal Marines) were rejected. However, while the 
joint model had worked well during the war—when amphibious warfare was a 
high-priority task and COHQ enjoyed the patronage of the prime minister—it 
was less successful after 1945. In the face of postwar austerity and ambivalence 
on the part of the navy, British capabilities atrophied. COHQ could study, teach, 
advise, and pressure, but it could not force the navy, or indeed the army and the 
air force, to devote scarce resources to something they did not consider a prior-
ity. Moreover, the very existence of this independent organization appeared to 
aggravate admirals, who did not appreciate being harassed by a junior partner 
over something they felt should be the business of the navy.
That situation did not change until the navy found a role for amphibious forces 
within an expeditionary strategy that could be used to justify the maintenance 
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of a balanced fleet. This was associated with the change in the accepted model 
for amphibious operations and an acceptance that, while amphibious operations 
would retain a joint element, the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy would play 
the predominant part. Fortuitously, this put the navy in control at the same time it 
discovered a new self-interest in developing this role. A joint-service element was 
retained, but amphibious warfare became what the admirals had argued consis-
tently it should be: the primary concern of the navy and the marines, supported 
by joint forces as required.
It is important to note that the joint institutions created in the 1960s were 
very different from those that had gone before. In his semiofficial history of the 
Combined Operations Organization, Brigadier Bernard E. Fergusson, British 
army (Ret.), explained the difference as follows: “There is all the difference in 
the world between an inter-service meeting, however amiable and co-operative, 
from which all hands afterward return to their respective bases; and a combined 
[i.e., joint] headquarters, where all hands live together, use the same washbasins, 
and owe allegiance to a single chief.”81 The approach from 1940 forward was for a 
joint organization independent of the army, navy, and air force. In theory at least, 
those involved forgot the color of their uniforms and reflected the interests of 
“combined operations” above those of their parent services. All involved pulled 
in the same direction, under the authority of the Chief of Combined Operations. 
As Fergusson put it, “You cannot paddle your own canoe when you are all in the 
same boat.”82 It was a highly evolved form of jointery.
In the 1960s, this changed to an approach based on joint cooperation and col-
laboration, enabled by a joint committee, secretariat, and training establishment. 
The new structure, founded on consensus among service representatives, put 
control back in the hands of the army, navy, and air force. Members of the JWC 
were representatives of their own services; they were no longer in the same boat, 
and they paddled their own canoes. This was a less-evolved form of jointery, but 
it produced better results. The joint institutions promoted thinking about joint 
warfare and included within their remit the development and promulgation of 
doctrine for amphibious operations. By design, they devoted less time and at-
tention specifically to this subject than had AWHQ. This did not matter, as the 
navy (and marines) had picked up the baton. From the mid-1950s onward, am-
phibious warfare was predominantly a naval-service responsibility, and the naval 
service—unlike AWHQ—had the power to turn interest into action.
MORE-RECENT APPLICATIONS
The historical case study illustrates the difficulty faced by a joint organization 
tasked with maintaining proficiency in a role to which the main provider (in 
this case, the navy) does not accord a high priority. It is not difficult to find other 
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examples of the same dynamic in action. Within the British context, the fate of 
fixed-wing naval aviation within Joint Force Harrier (JFH) offers a cautionary tale.
JFH (known initially as Joint Force 2000) was established in April 2000. It 
brought together the navy’s Sea Harrier FA2 and the RAF’s Harrier GR7/GR9 
squadrons within a new joint structure, ultimately under the control of RAF 
Strike Command. The approach was designed to create synergies and savings in 
a situation in which both aircraft types operated from the navy’s three Invincible-
class aircraft carriers, the FA2s in an air-defense role and the GR7/GR9s for 
ground attack.83 This case is not entirely analogous to the experience of the post-
1945 amphibious forces, as the structures were different, but the history of JFH 
reveals the same central dynamic, in which joint approaches could not overcome 
the entrenched and self-interested attitudes of a dominant service.
Within just two years of the establishment of JFH a decision was taken to 
retire the navy’s Sea Harriers to prioritize limited resources toward the RAF Har-
riers, which were considered more valuable for the operations then envisaged. 
The decision appears to have been taken against the wishes of the navy, whose 
carriers (and thus the fleet) were left without a fixed-wing air-defense capability. 
The decision was supported actively by the RAF and by the Deputy Chief of the 
Defence Staff (Equipment), Air Vice-Marshal Sir Graham E. “Jock” Stirrup, who, 
unusually for an airman, seemed confident in the ability of the navy’s surface-to-
air missiles to provide an appropriate alternative to fighter cover.84 Later, as (joint) 
Chief of the Defence Staff, Stirrup also seems to have been instrumental in a deci-
sion during the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review to retire the entire 
remaining Harrier force earlier than planned.85 Here the Harriers were offered 
up as a cost-cutting sacrifice required to keep the RAF’s fleet of aging land-based 
Tornado bombers in service for a few more years. The decision appears to have 
been taken against naval advice and at the last minute, upon the personal inter-
vention of Stirrup—who seems not to have forgotten the color of his uniform. It 
left the navy with no fixed-wing aircraft able to fly from its carriers, contributing 
to the early retirement of those vessels.86 
RAF reluctance to divert scarce resources to naval aviation reflected a long-
standing preference for land-based, fast jets over anything that operates from the 
sea. The RAF desire to focus on established core roles, to the detriment of joint ca-
pabilities, may mirror the reluctance of the postwar Admiralty to divert resources 
to amphibious forces in the years after 1945; both organizations felt they should 
focus on other things, ones that reflected core service roles. It is not clear that any 
type of joint institution could have changed this; the key requirement would have 
been a parent organization able to recognize the importance of the joint capability.
The British currently are regenerating their fixed-wing carrier capability af-
ter an interregnum of almost ten years, with RAF and RN F-35B Lightning IIs 
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operating from the two new Queen Elizabeth–class ships. The aircraft fall under 
the control of a new joint organization, Lightning Force Headquarters, based 
at RAF Marham, commanded by an RAF officer and under the control of RAF 
No. 1 Group (the successor to Strike Command).87 This appears to be jointery 
with one service in the ascendant. The analysis above suggests that this could be 
a positive thing, provided the RAF recognizes the importance of this role and 
identifies a self-interest in supporting it (as the Admiralty did with amphibious 
operations in the late 1950s). Ongoing debates over whether Britain will supple-
ment the initial buy of forty-eight F-35Bs with more of the same or, as many in 
the RAF prefer, with F-35As unable to operate from British carriers may reveal 
the extent to which joint imperatives can prevail.88 The history of RAF antipathy 
toward carrier-based aviation does not promote optimism.
The contemporary U.S. armed forces have not adopted jointery to the same 
degree as their British counterparts, although numerous joint initiatives have been 
pursued since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The functional com-
ponent commands (Cyber, Special Operations, Transportation, and Strategic Com-
mands) provide an interesting example, as they came about because of the need 
to coordinate joint elements and a fear that the parent services otherwise would 
not devote enough attention to these areas. The similarity to COHQ is obvious; 
however, differences also are apparent, most notably in terms of resources, power, 
and status. The component commands are led by four-star officers—equal in rank 
to the service chiefs. They have sizable budgets and access to Congress. They more 
closely resemble the wartime COHQ at the height of its influence under Mountbat-
ten than the neglected, truncated organization in existence after 1945.
Despite this, periodic conflict between these commands and the parent ser-
vices is inevitable. Thus, for example, note the differences between U.S. Transpor-
tation Command (TRANSCOM) and the U.S. Air Force over planned reductions 
to the latter’s tanker fleet, with the commander of TRANSCOM (General Stephen 
R. Lyons, USA) arguing against the Air Force position in front of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee in early 2020.89 The established dynamic of a service 
seeking to reduce emphasis on a joint capability so as to prioritize something else 
is evident once again. Important differences here, compared with COHQ, are that 
TRANSCOM is in a stronger position institutionally to advance its case, and also, 
critically, that TRANSCOM provides a service that is recognized widely as impor-
tant.90 Within this context, the joint approach has some chance of success and may 
provide an important coordinating function akin to that of COHQ during the war.
This article has argued that joint imperatives prosper when they have the sup-
port of a powerful patron, or when key furnishers of support and material rec-
ognize the value of the service they provide and are willing to make sacrifices 
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to maintain them. The most effective way to encourage this has been to link the 
needs of the joint organization to the self-interest of the services.
The experience of COHQ shows that structures that work well in one context 
(during a major war) may prove less advantageous once conditions and priorities 
change (after the war). In the latter case, the situation for Combined Operations 
might not have been so bad had it enjoyed the support and protection of a pow-
erful Ministry of Defence, but the weakness of Britain’s central organization for 
defense at that time, allied to severe resource constraints, militated against this.
With regard to responsibility for amphibious warfare, the analysis above ap-
pears to validate Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins’s assessment from the 1940s. 
Amphibious capabilities were served best by a structure in which they became 
the responsibility primarily of one service, and when that service recognized the 
value in maintaining such capabilities. The American experience in this field, 
both past and present, appears to reinforce that conclusion. In the United States, 
proficiency in amphibious operations has been supported by the existence of a 
powerful parent organization with a strong institutional imperative to focus on 
such operations. The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy have an impressive track 
record in this respect—a case too well established to require further elaboration 
here.91 
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